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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 









ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Saonarah Jeudy, an African-American female, brings this action against the Attorney General 
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 etseq., and Title VII o f the Civil Rights 
Act of1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Jeudy asserts claims of unlawful race, sex, and disability 
discrimination based on the denial of her requests for a reasonable accommodation and subsequent 
termination of her employment from the Federal Bureau of Prisons. She also contends that her 
requests for an accommodation were denied and she was terminated in retaliation for complaining 
about sexual harassment by a supervisor. The case is presently before the Court on Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. #40). Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts set 
forth in Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint (D.E. #35). For the reasons discussed below, 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in full.1
1 Defendant objects to the statement o f material facts included in Ms. Jeudy’s Response in 
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. #53). Local Rule 7.5(c) requires 
the statement of material facts submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to 
“correspond with the order and with the paragraph numbering scheme used by the movant.” S.D. 
Fla. L.R. 7.5(c). Defendant asserts that, rather than responding to Defendant’s statement of material 
facts, Ms. Jeudy included “her own independent Statement that is sprinkled with passing objections 
to Defendant’s paragraphs that Plaintiff arguably ‘disputes.’” Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Def. ’s 
Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #55) at 1. Defendant also contends that the paragraphs of his statement of 
material facts to which Ms. Jeudy offers no response should be deemed admitted. Id. at 2 n.1. The 
Court, however, must review the record to determine whether the movant’s statement is supported 
by the evidence. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(d). Thus, while Ms. Juedy has not complied with Local Rule 
7.5 to the letter, the Court will look to the record in determining whether, when viewed in the light
AUTHENTICATED 
U.S. G O V E R N M E N T ,* -*
INFORMATION ^  J
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Jeudy began working for the Federal Bureau of Prisons on June 11, 2006, as a 
probationary correctional officer at the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida. Ms. Jeudy 
contends that, shortly after her employment commenced, she was subjected to sexual harassment by 
a supervisor, Lieutenant Kevin Burden. Specifically, Ms. Jeudy claims that Lieutenant Burden made 
several inappropriate comments regarding her physical appearance. See Jeudy Dep. at 52:11-22 
(A70)2 (“He just made a comment like, you have the most beautiful soft skin and whatever. . . . And 
he would come to my post and make comments all the time . . . .”). She also contends that he 
telephoned her while she was working and whispered into the phone without identifying himself. 
See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 9 (A24). Additionally, on one occasion, Lieutenant Burden called Ms. 
Jeudy into his office to put his shoe back on his foot. See Jeudy Dep. at 50:18-51:9 (A70). The 
alleged harassment continued until Ms. Jeudy complained in March 2007. See November 29, 2007 
Letter from Teri Guttman Valdes to Roy E. Ferguson at 1 (A14). Ms. Jeudy spoke to Lieutenant 
Miller, various co-workers, and union officials about the Lieutenant Burden’s harassment. Id.
In early 2007, Ms. Jeudy became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Ms. Jeudy experienced 
pelvic pain, which she attributed to fibroids in her uterus, and requested an accommodation due to 
her pregnancy. Specifically, Ms. Jeudy informed Lieutenant Hicks that she was pregnant and asked 
if  she could be placed on the night shift. Jeudy Dep. at 69:10-14 (A74). According to Ms. Jeudy, 
she requested this shift because she “wanted to be on the shift with less activity.” Id. at 64:21-22 
(A72); see also id. at 71:22-72:1 (A74) (Q: And the only accommodation you asked for was to be 
changed to the midnight shift? A: Right, because inmates are sleeping. If I am throwing up, they 
wouldn’t see it, and if  I am in pain, I could deal with my pain.”).3 Lieutenant Hicks told her to speak
most favorable to M s. J eudy, the evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom present 
a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. The following factual 
background is either undisputed or read in the light most favorable to Ms. Jeudy, as is required at 
the summary judgment stage.
2 An Exhibit Appendix, comprised of documents labeled A-000001 through A-000088, was
filed with the Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. # 41­
1). Both parties cite to pages contained in the Exhibit Appendix as “A ___.” For ease of reference,
the Court cites to the Exhibit Appendix in the same manner.
3 While Ms. Jeudy specifically requested a shift change, she also stated, in her deposition, 
that she suggested additional types of accommodations, such as being placed at the front desk or in 
the phone room. See Jeudy Dep. at 72:3-14 (A74).
2
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with the other rookie officers to see if  someone would switch with her. See id. at 69:14-16 (A74). 
Ms. Jeudy was unable to find an officer to switch shifts with her. See id. at 69:18-19 (A74).
Ms. Jeudy also testified that she spoke to Captain Edward Felz about her pregnancy 
approximately three times between February and May 2007. Id. at 79:9-12 (A76). In May 2007, 
after conferring with Eric Y oung, the president of the union responsible for representing correctional 
officers, Ms. Jeudy submitted a doctor’s note in support of her requests for an accommodation. The 
note stated that Ms. Jeudy was under the care of Dr. Susan Davila for “a pregnancy complicated by 
hyperemesis & pelvic pain” and that Ms. Jeudy “should not repetitively climb stairs and should be 
accommodated.” See Dr. Davila Note (A88). Ms. Jeudy’s requests were denied.
On May 11, 2007, Ms. Jeudy attended Annual Refresher Training at the Federal Detention 
Center. See May 14, 2007 Felz Mem. (A4). Captain Felz and approximately thirty other staff 
members were present. Id. During training, Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone rang, and, at Captain Felz’s 
direction, Ms. Jeudy removed her phone from the institution. Id. She later apologized to Captain 
Felz for the incident. Id. At her deposition, Ms. Jeudy acknowledged that she should not have had 
her phone at work while she was in the building, but stated that during the training session everyone 
had their phones, including Captain Felz. Jeudy Dep. at 47:17-48:20 (A69).
Three days later, on May 14, 2007, while conducting rounds during the 4:00 p.m. count, 
Lieutenant Burden noticed that a cell door in Ms. Jeudy’s unit was ajar and unlocked. See May 14, 
2007 Burden Mem. (A5). According to Lieutenant Burden, Ms. Jeudy stated that “she could not 
secure the unit because she had been ill in the restroom, and could not secure her unit in time for the 
4:00 p.m. count.” Id. In her deposition, Ms. Jeudy confirmed that one of the doors in her unit was 
not properly secured and that she was vomiting and sick. See Jeudy Dep. at 60:4-23 (A71). She 
contends, however, that the door that was not properly secured was to a cell for inmates with 
disabilities and that no one was in that cell at that time. See id. at 60:6-25 (A71). This incident was 
documented in a memorandum from Lieutenant Burden to Captain Felz and on Ms. Jeudy’s 
performance log. See May 14, 2007 Burden Mem. (A5); May 14, 2007 Performance Log (A53).
By letter dated June 6, 2007, the warden, Loren A. Grayer, advised Ms. Jeudy that she would 
be removed, during probation, from her position as a correctional officer effective June 8, 2007. See 
June 6, 2007 Letter from Loren A. Grayer, Warden, to Saonarah Jeudy (A1-3). Ms. Jeudy was 
terminated because of the May 11, 2007 and May 14, 2007 incidents described above. See id. At 
the time of her termination, Ms. Jeudy was not present at the Federal Detention Center. She was on
3
Case 1:10-cv-22873-PCH Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/11 10:40:09 Page 4
of 19
leave because she fell at work on May 29, 2007. See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 27-28 (A42-43). 
Accordingly, the termination letter was mailed to her residence. See id. After Ms. Jeudy’s 
termination, Charles Laugh, a union officer, informed the warden that, prior to Ms. Jeudy’s 
termination, Officer Felz stated: “Can you believe that girl got pregnant during her probationary 
period.” Aff. of Charles Laugh (D.E. #53-1) at 1.4
Ms. Jeudy initiated the present suit on August 6, 2010. In her Third Amended Complaint, 
she alleges five distinct claims. In Count I, Ms. Jeudy contends that Defendant violated the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by failing to accommodate her alleged disability—her pregnancy—and 
by terminating her as a result of that alleged disability. Count II provides that Defendant 
discriminated against Ms. Jeudy based on her race because white male officers received reasonable 
accommodations and were not terminated for committing violations similar to those committed by 
Ms. Jeudy. The allegations of Count III and Count IV mirror the allegations in Count II, except that 
the purported discrimination is based on gender (Count III) and pregnancy (Count IV) instead of 
race. Finally, in Count V, Ms. Jeudy asserts that her requests for a reasonable accommodation were 
denied and she was terminated in retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by Lieutenant Burden.5 
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). Here, Defendant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court o f the basis 
for [his] motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which [he] believes demonstrate the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
4 As noted in Defendant’s presently pending Motion in Limine (D.E. # 61), the Laugh 
Affidavit attributes the above statement to a “Captain Feldman.” There is no mention of a “Captain 
Feldman” in the record. The record, however, makes clear that there is a Captain Felz and that 
Captain Felz is the individual who allegedly made this statement. See Jeudy Sworn Statement at 20 
(A35), 31 (A46); Dep’t of Justice Final Agency Decision (D.E. # 35-1) at 17. In Plaintiff’s Response 
to Defendant’s Motion in Limine (D.E. #63), Ms. Jeudy acknowledged that the individual’s last 
name was inadvertently typed as “Feldman” instead of “Felz” in the Laugh Affidavit.
5 While Ms. Jeudy’s retaliation claim is based on the sexual harassment by Lieutenant 
Burden and her obj ections thereto, there is no separate claim regarding the alleged sexual harassment 
itself. See April 20, 2011 Letter from Teri Guttman Valdes to Christopher Macchiaroli (A62) 
(“Please be advised that Plaintiff is not proceeding forward with a ‘ sexual harassment’ species of sex 
discrimination claim in this matter. Rather, the sexual harassment and her objections and reporting 
of that harassment form the basis for her retaliation claims.”).
4
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The burden then shifts to Ms. Jeudy to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See 
Fitzpatrick v. City o f Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). Ms. Jeudy may not simply rest 
upon the allegations of her Third Amended Complaint. Rather, she “has a duty to present affirmative 
evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. 
Napolitano, No. 09-60744-CIV-HUCK, 2010 WL 431898, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2010) (citing 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Additionally, a mere “scintilla” of 
evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “A genuine issue for trial exists only if  
sufficient evidence is presented favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that 
party.” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1284-85. Furthermore, 
while this Court must construe the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in Ms. 
Jeudy’s favor, summary judgment may be granted where the evidence favoring Ms. Jeudy is “merely 
colorable or is not significantly probative.” See id. at 1285.
As noted above, Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint contains several claims based on 
various types of discrimination. Ms. Jeudy’s claim of disability discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act, her claims of race and sex discrimination under Title VII, and her claim of 
retaliation under Title VII will be addressed in turn.
A. Disability Discrimination
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “prohibits federal agencies from discriminating in 
employment against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability.” Shannon v. Postmaster Gen. 
o f the U.S. PostalServ., 335 F. App’x 21,24 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 
1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)). To succeed on a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was: (1) disabled or “regarded as” disabled; (2) a qualified 
individual; and (3) discriminated against because of his or her disability.6 Id. Ms. Jeudy contends 
that she was discriminated against when her requests for a reasonable accommodation due to a 
disability or perceived disability—her pregnancy—were denied. She also claims that she was 
terminated because of this disability or perceived disability. An individual is disabled under the 
Rehabilitation Act if  that individual (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 6
6 “Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards 
used in ADA [Americans with Disability Act] cases.” Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 
2000). “Cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for cases under the ADA, and 
vice-versa.” Id. at 1305 n.2.
5
Case 1:10-cv-22873-PCH Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/11 10:40:09 Page 6
of 19
one or more major life activities; (2) has a record o f such an impairment; or (3) is “regarded as” 
having such an impairment. Id. at 24; Cash, 231 F.3d at 1305.
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues that Ms. Jeudy’s claims under the 
Rehabilitation Act must fail because her pregnancy does not constitute a disability under federal law. 
Defendant correctly contends, and Ms. Jeudy concedes, that pregnancy is not normally considered 
a disability. See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 3; Farrell v. Time Serv. Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 
1298 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“It is clearly established that pregnancy per se does not constitute a disability 
under federal law.”); Bryson v. Mau, Inc., No. 8:09-321-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 1542506, at *3 
(D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2010) (“With near unanimity, federal courts have held that a pregnancy is not a 
‘disability’ under the ADA, absent some atypical complication.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (“[P]regnancy 
and related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute a ‘physical 
impairment’ under the ADA.”).
Whether a person is disabled, however, must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See 
Garrett v. Univ. Ala. at Birmingham Bd. o f Trs., 507 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Each claim 
of disability must be considered on a case-by-case basis. When the symptoms of an impairment vary 
widely from person to person, an individualized assessment of the effect of an impairment is 
particularly necessary.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, Ms. Jeudy argues 
that she did not experience a typical pregnancy. She alleges that she suffered from complications 
during her pregnancy—specifically, pelvic pain that resulted from the presence of fibroids in her 
uterus.7 See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 3. She further claims that such complications 
substantially limited her in the major life activity of walking, standing, or otherwise ambulating. Id. 
Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy contends that she is disabled for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. The 
issue before the Court, therefore, is whether Ms. Juedy has presented sufficient evidence to raise a 7
7 Defendant argues that Ms. Jeudy’s medical records establish that she suffered from pelvic 
pain unrelated to any pregnancy for years and that there is no connection between Ms. Jeudy’s 
fibroids and her purported pelvic pain. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1) 
at 7-8. Accordingly, Defendant contends that Ms. Jeudy’s allegation that she should have received 
an accommodation based on her pregnancy is disingenuous. Id. at 9. While it is questionable, 
therefore, whether the pain Ms. Jeudy experienced during her pregnancy was the result of the 
presence of fibroids in her uterus during that pregnancy or whether it was due to some medical 
condition completely unrelated to pregnancy or fibroids, the Court must assume, for purposes of this 
analysis, that the pelvic pain Ms. Jeudy experienced during her pregnancy was in fact caused by 
fibroids in her uterus, as Ms. Jeudy claims.
6
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genuine issue o f material fact as to whether her pregnancy and its related complications amount to 
an impairment and whether such impairment substantially limited her ability to walk, stand, or 
otherwise ambulate. Ms. Jeudy has not met this burden.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Jeudy can establish that her pregnancy related 
complications constitute an impairment, she has failed to present sufficient evidence to show that 
this impairment substantially limited her ability walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate. A person is 
“substantially limited” if  he or she is “unable to perform a major life activity that the average person 
in the general population can perform” or “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or 
duration under which [he or she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the 
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform 
that same major life activity.” Simpson v. Ala. Dep’t o f Human Res., 311 F. App’x 264, 267 (11th 
Cir. 2009).8 Factors relevant to determining whether an individual is substantially limited include 
the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its permanent or 
long-term impact. Id. The evidence submitted by Ms. Jeudy on this issue consists of a doctor’s note 
stating that she suffered from “a pregnancy complicated by hyperemesis & pelvic pain” and that she 
“should not repetitively climb stairs and should be accommodated” and Ms. Jeudy’s own contention 
that she experienced “severe pain” during her pregnancy. See Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for 
Summ. J. (D.E. #53) at 5. This is simply insufficient to survive summary judgment.
While Ms. Jeudy argues that she experienced “severe pain” due to her pregnancy related 
complications, her actual deposition testimony reflects that her impairment was not of the nature, 
severity, or duration necessary to be considered substantially limiting. In her deposition, Ms. Jeudy 
stated that she “had pain with the fibroids, off and on,” that “[t]he pain wasn’t an ongoing thing all
8 This definition of “substantially limited” originates from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations promulgated to implement the equal employment 
provisions the ADA. The definition of “substantially limited” has subsequently changed due to the 
enactment of major changes to the ADA by Congress, which went into effect on January 1, 2009. 
Specifically, Congress “expressly instructed courts that ‘[t]he definition of disability in [the ADA] 
shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.’” Fikes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 322 F. App’x 
882, 883 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008)). In Fikes, an unreported opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that such changes are 
not retroactive and looked to the ADA “as it was in effect at the time of the alleged discrimination.” 
Id.; see also Tarmas v. Sec’y o f Navy, No. 10-15370, 2011 WL 2636866, at *6 n.9 (11th Cir. July 
6, 2011) (“[T]his court has never held that the ADAAA is retroactively applicable. Other circuits 
have concluded that the amendments are not retroactively applicable.”). As the alleged 
discrimination in this case took place in 2007, this Court looks to the law as it existed at that time.
7
Case 1:10-cv-22873-PCH Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/11 10:40:09 Page 8
of 19
day long, it was off and on,” and that “the pain comes in and out.” Jeudy Dep. at 28:18-19 (A65), 
72:1-2 (A74); 73:19-20 (A75). Additionally, she testified that she was “getting better with the 
fibroids” until she fell at work on May 29, 2007. Id. at 45:5-11 (A69) (“Q. The pain you were 
having, was that because of your pregnancy or because of the fall? A. Both. Q. Okay. A. Mainly 
because of the fall, because I was getting better with the fibroids, and once I fell, it all started again, 
the pain came back.”).
Such testimony indicates that, at most, Ms. Jeudy was at times limited by the pain caused by 
the fibroids in her uterus. That Ms. Jeudy suffered some limitation, however, is not enough; the 
limitation must be substantial. SeeFikes, 322 F. App’x at 884 (finding claims that plaintiff “suffers 
pain when sitting or standing for ‘long periods’ and also when he bends, kneels, walks, lifts, or 
climbs ‘excessively’” insufficient to show he was substantially limited in major life activities of 
walking and working); Allen v. U.S. Postmaster Gen., 158 F. App’x 240, 243 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(“[A]lthough Allen’s foot injuries prevent her from walking long distances without rests on account 
of pain, the record does not demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the major life activity 
ofwalking.”); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir. 1997) (“We have found few 
cases defining what constitutes a substantial limitation on a person’s ability to walk. What cases do 
exist, though, make clear that moderate difficulty or pain experienced while walking does not rise 
to the level of a disability.”) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy’s deposition 
testimony is insufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether her impairment substantially limited 
a major life activity.
Similarly, the doctor’s note upon which Ms. Jeudy relies lends little support to her claims. 
The note simply provides that Ms. Jeudy “should not repetitively climb stairs and should be 
accommodated.” Davila Note (A88). It contains no details about how the pregnancy related 
complications actually hindered her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate. Nor does her 
doctor indicate that any tests were performed to establish the extent to which Ms. Jeudy was limited 
in her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate or in any manner quantify the degree of 
limitation. See Garrett, 507 F.3d at 1315 (“For several reasons, this evidence of Garrett’s 
impairments and limitations fails to raise an issue of triable fact that she was disabled. . . . [W]e note 
the lack of any objective evidence of the extent of Garrett’s limitation. While Dr. Miller asserts that 
Garret was precluded from performing medium or heavy jobs, he has not referenced any objective
8
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criteria supporting his conclusion. He did not identify any test that he performed, or required Garrett 
to perform, to determine the extent of her limitations.”).
Furthermore, the fact that the note solely provided that Ms. Jeudy should not “repetitively” 
climb stairs, and did not contain a more significant restriction on her movement in general, 
establishes that, at most, Ms. Jeudy suffered from a diminished activity tolerance with respect to her 
ability to walk. This is not enough to create a factual issue for a jury. See Hillburn v. Marata Elecs. 
N. Am., 181 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that an assertion of a “diminished activity 
tolerance” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact); Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 
F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that Hilburn “held that a diminished activity tolerance for 
normal daily activities such as lifting, running and performing manual tasks, as well as a lifting 
restriction, did not constitute a disability under the ADA”).
Though she ultimately bears the burden of establishing her disability, Ms. Jeudy presents only 
minimal evidence as to how her alleged impairment affected her ability to walk, stand, or otherwise 
ambulate. All she offers in opposition to summary judgment is her own subjective testimony and 
the doctor’s note described above, neither of which is significantly probative on the issue of 
substantial limitation. She does not address any impact her complications had on her daily life 
outside of work, and, as to her job, Ms. Jeudy contends that she fully performed the duties required 
of her as a correctional officer. See Jeudy Dep. at 81:7-24 (A77). Thus, while Ms. Jeudy’s 
pregnancy related complications may have caused pain and may have affected, to some degree, her 
ability to walk, stand, or otherwise ambulate, she has not produced sufficient evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably conclude that she was substantially limited. See Brockman v. Snow, 217 F. 
App’x 201, 209 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff’s evidence fell “far short of showing that she 
was substantially limited in a major life activity,” where such evidence consisted of a doctor’s note 
recommending bed rest and a claim that plaintiff was instructed not to walk long distances, and 
where plaintiff’s own actions—including performing her normal work functions— contradicted her 
assertion of a substantial limitation).9 Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has failed to raise a genuine issue of
9 Alternatively, Ms. Jeudy argues that she was “regarded as” disabled by Defendant. There 
is simply no basis in the record, however, to conclude that Defendant regarded Ms. Jeudy as having 
a disability. “The mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee’s impairment is insufficient 
to demonstrate that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.” Luna v. Walgreen Co., 575 
F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 
1999)). While Defendant had knowledge that Ms. Jeudy was pregnant and, arguably, that she was 
suffering from complications, Ms. Jeudy has offered no evidence to indicate that Defendant regarded 
her pregnancy or its complications as disabling.
9
Case 1:10-cv-22873-PCH Document 70 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/07/11 10:40:09 Page 10
of 19
material fact as to whether her pregnancy and its attendant complications amount to a disability, and 
her claims under the Rehabilitation Act fail as a matter o f law.10
B. Race and Sex Discrimination
Ms. Jeudy also alleges that she was subjected to discrimination in violation of Title VII. Title 
VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of that 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). As noted 
above, Ms. Jeudy’s Third Amended Complaint contains one count of race discrimination (Count II). 
It also contains two counts of sex discrimination, one based simply on gender (Count III) and one 
based on the fact that Ms. Jeudy was also pregnant (Count IV).11 Specifically, Ms. Jeudy contends 
that she was discriminated against based on her race and sex because other employees—those who 
were not African American, pregnant, or female—received requested accommodations and were not 
terminated for allegations similar to those that formed the purported basis for Plaintiff’s termination. 
Because the Title VII disparate treatment analysis is the same irrespective of whether the alleged 
violation is based on race or sex, the Court can analyze these three claims together.
Where, as here, a summary judgment motion is before the Court in a Title VII case involving 
circumstantial evidence, the Court analyzes the case within the confines o f the burden-shifting test 
set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Greer v. Birmingham 
Beverage Co., 291 F. A pp’x 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2008). Under this framework, Ms. Jeudy must first 
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine that she has satisfied the elements of 
her prima facie case of discrimination. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802). If 
Ms. Jeudy meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to Defendant to “articulate a legitimate,
10 Because Ms. Jeudy has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her 
pregnancy constituted a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court need not decide whether 
Ms. Jeudy was a qualified individual or whether she was actually discriminated against on the basis 
of such disability. Similarly, because the Court need not reach the discrimination prong of Ms. 
Jeudy’s Rehabilitation Act claim, it is also unnecessary to address whether Ms. Jeudy failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies on the requests for accommodation made before May 1, 2007, 
as Defendant contends. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. # 41-1) at 13.
11 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), provides that the 
prohibition against sex-based discrimination in Title VII “applies with equal force to discrimination 
on the basis of ‘pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.’” Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 
209 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). “The analysis required for 
a pregnancy discrimination claim is the same type of analysis used in other Title VII sex 
discrimination suits.” Id.
10
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.” Id. The burden then shifts back to Ms. 
Jeudy to show that the reasons articulated by Defendant are pretextual. Id.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Ms. Jeudy must show that: “(1) she 
is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) her 
employer treated similarly situated employees outside of her protected class more favorably than she 
was treated; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., 447 F.3d 1319, 
1323 (11th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. B/EAerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (same). 
Defendant does not dispute that Ms. Jeudy satisfied the first and fourth elements of her prima facie 
case. Thus, the Court need only address whether M s. J eudy was subj ected to an adverse employment 
action and, if  so, whether Defendant treated a similarly situated employee outside of her protected 
class more favorably. Ms. Jeudy states that the denial o f her requests for an accommodation and her 
subsequent termination both constitute adverse actions. Defendant contends, however, that the 
denial of a request for an accommodation does not amount to an adverse employment action for 
purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for 
Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1) at 18.
To establish an adverse employment action under Title VII’s substantive provision, “an 
employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.” Davis v. Town o f Lake Park Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). 
Furthermore, “the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s 
action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a 
reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. The denial of Ms. Jeudy’s requests for an 
accommodation did not impact the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, but simply 
maintained the status quo. Ms. Jeudy was required to do nothing more than perform her job duties 
in the same manner, to the same extent, and under the same conditions as she had before she 
requested an accommodation.
Moreover, no reasonable person could find the denial of Ms. Jeudy’s request for an 
accommodation materially adverse. “Employers have no duty to accommodate an employee if  the 
employee is not disabled under the ADA.” Swain v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sch. Bd., 146 F.3d 855, 858 
(11th Cir. 1998). As previously discussed, Ms. Jeudy’s pregnancy related complications do not 
amount to a disability. Ms. Jeudy, therefore, was not entitled to any accommodation. Surely a 
reasonable person could understand that an employee might not receive a requested accommodation
11
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where an employer is under no obligation to provide one. Accordingly, the denial of Ms. Jeudy’s 
requests for an accommodation does not amount to an adverse employment action sufficient to 
support a prima facie case o f discrimination.
Ms. Jeudy’s termination, however, does constitute an adverse employment action, and Ms. 
Juedy has therefore satisfied the second element o f her prima facie case. Accordingly, the issue 
becomes whether Ms. Jeudy can show that a similarly situated employee outside o f her protected 
class was treated more favorably than she was treated. To satisfy this final element of her prima 
facie case, Ms. Jeudy must identify an non-protected employee— an employee who is not a pregnant 
African-American female—who engaged in misconduct that was the same as or similar to the 
misconduct upon which Ms. Jeudy’s termination was based but who was not similarly terminated. 
See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1999). The quantity and quality of a 
comparator’s misconduct must be “nearly identical” to Ms. Juedy’s misconduct “to prevent courts 
from second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Id.12
As noted previously, the June 6, 2007 letter notifying Ms. Jeudy of her termination specifies 
two events that contributed to the decision to terminate her. The first is the May 11, 2007 incident 
in which Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone rang during a training session for staff members. In the letter, the 
warden stated that the introduction o f contraband, including cellular phones, into the institution is 
in violation of the Standards of Employee Conduct. See June 6, 2007 Letter from Loren A. Grayer, 
Warden, to Saonarah Jeudy at 1 (A1). The second event, and arguably the more serious violation, 
involved Ms. Jeudy’s failure to properly secure her unit during the 4:00 p.m. count on May 14, 2007. 
With respect to this violation, the warden noted that “[t]he Bureau is responsible for the safety and 
security of staff and inmates” and that Ms. Jeudy’s “action was in direct violation of [her] Post 
Orders.” Id. at 2 (A2). Accordingly, for Ms. Jeudy to satisfy the final element of her prima facie
12 Identifying a proper comparator is necessary regardless of whether the Title VII plaintiff 
actually committed the violations alleged. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 
1306, 1311 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998), superceded in part by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[N]o 
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing just that she belongs to a protected class and 
that she did not violate her employer’s work rule. The plaintiff must also point to someone similarly 
situated (but outside the protected class) who disputed a violation of the rule and who was, in fact, 
treated better.”); Miller-Goodwin v. City o f Panama City Beach, Fla., 385 F. App’x 966, 971 n.2 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[R]egardless of whether [the plaintiff] committed the alleged rule violations, she 
is still required to show that a similarly situated male who committed the same rule violations 
received more favorable treatment than her.”).
12
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case, she must identify an employee outside her protected class whose misconduct is “nearly 
identical” to the conduct discussed in the June 6, 2007 letter.
Ms. Jeudy has failed to identify such a comparator. While she alleges that “everybody” had 
their cell phones during the May 11,2007 training session, including Captain Felz, and contends that 
the backup officer who was assisting her with the May 14, 2007 count also should have been 
subjected to discipline, she cannot identify any employee who was charged with committing both 
of the violations upon which her termination was based or who committed two “nearly identical” or 
extremely similar violations. Moreover, Ms. Jeudy has failed to identify any employee who 
committed two such violations within three days of each other—not to mention during a 
probationary period— as she was charged with doing. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has not identified a 
similarly situated employee outside of her protected class who was treated more favorably than she 
was treated, as is necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Summary judgment 
is therefore appropriate. See Bush v. Houston Cnty. Comm’n, 414 F. App’x 264, 267 (11th Cir. 
2011) (recognizing, in pretext analysis, that “[e]mployees who have committed multiple policy 
violations are not similarly situated to employees who committed only one such violation.”); Silvera 
v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff and 
proposed comparator, who were both arrested for similar offenses, were not similarly situated where 
the plaintiff had three additional arrests); Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1369 (finding that a female plaintiff 
was not similarly situated to male comparators where each of the male comparators was involved 
in a “single incident of misconduct or alleged misconduct,” and the plaintiff “committed at least four 
policy violations”); Jones, 137 F.3d at 1313 (noting that “Plaintiff’s multiple instances of 
misconduct on the same day may simply have been the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’”).
Even assuming, however, that Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case, her race and sex 
discrimination claims must fail because she cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. 
As noted above, Defendant asserts two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Ms. Jeudy’s 
termination—the May 11, 2007 cell phone incident and the May 14, 2007 breach of security. See 
Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. # 41-1) at 16-17. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy must 
present enough evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether each of Defendant’s proffered 
reasons is pretext for discrimination. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the
13
employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.” (citing Combs v. Plantation 
Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997))).
To establish pretext, Ms. Jeudy must demonstrate that Defendant’s proferred reasons were 
not the true reasons for her termination. See Ekokotu v. Boyle, 294 F. App’x 523, 526 (11th Cir. 
2008) (quoting Jackson v. State o f Ala. Tenure Comm ’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)). She 
may do so “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated 
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 
credence.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 405 F.3d at 1289). At the summary judgment stage, “the district 
court must evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for 
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Jackson,
405 F.3d at 1289); see also Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538.
While the warden ultimately effectuated Ms. Jeudy’s termination, he did so based on reports 
provided by Ms. Jeudy’s supervisors. See Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ.
J. (D.E. #55) at 3 (“Defendant concedes that Loren A. Grayer—then prison Warden—relied on two 
separate memoranda detailing Plaintiff’s admitted violations of security protocols when terminating 
Plaintiff during her probationary period.”). Specifically, Captain Felz reported the May 11, 2007 
charge of misconduct regarding Ms. Jeudy’s cell phone, and Lieutenant Burden documented the 
breach of security on May 14, 2007. See May 14, 2007 Felz Mem (A4); May 14, 2007 Burden Mem. 
(A5); May 14, 2007 Performance Log (A53). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy attempts to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to pretext by demonstrating that her supervisors’ reports, which supplied the 
two reasons for her termination, are unworthy of credence.
Ms. Jeudy attempts to discredit Captain Felz’s report of the May 11, 2007 charge of 
misconduct in two ways. First, though admitting that she knew she should not have had her cell 
phone while she was in the building, Ms. Jeudy testified that everybody brought his or her cell phone 
into training, including Captain Felz. See Jeudy Dep. at 47:12-48:22 (A69). Second, Ms Jeudy 
contends that, shortly before she was terminated, Captain Felz stated to Charles Laugh: “Can you 
believe that girl got pregnant during her probationary period? See Aff. of Charles Laugh (D.E. #53- 
1) at 1; Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (D.E. #53) at 1-2, 6, 9.
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Arguably, the fact that Captain Felz punished Ms. Jeudy for her cell phone violation but did 
not similarly punish others for the same violation,13 combined with his comments about Ms. Jeudy’s 
pregnancy, potentially raises an issue as to whether Captain Felz reported Ms. Jeudy because she 
actually violated policy or because of some underlying discriminatory motive. This, in turn, calls 
into question one of the reasons proffered by the warden as grounds for Ms. Jeudy’s termination. 
As noted above, however, Ms. Jeudy must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact with respect to each of Defendant’s articulated reasons for the employment decision 
in order to survive summary judgment. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25; see also Combs, 106 
F.3d at 1543 (holding that, because the plaintiff failed to rebut one of the three reasons articulated 
by the defendant, the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Thus, even assuming 
that Ms. Jeudy has in fact produced sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether the 
May 11, 2007 cell phone incident was a legitimate reason for her termination or pretext, she must 
also refute Defendant’s second legitimate reason for her termination— failing to properly secure her 
unit during the 4:00 p.m. count on May 14, 2007.
Ms. Jeudy simply fails to present evidence sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether this 
proffered reason is pretext for discrimination. She presents no evidence to indicate that Lieutenant 
Burden’s report is unworthy of credence or to call into question the underlying violation she is 
accused of committing. While Ms. Jeudy testified that Officer Mendez, a white male officer who 
assisted her with the 4:00 p.m. count, also should have been disciplined, Ms. Jeudy acknowledged 
that “each officer is responsible for his or her own unit.” See Jeudy Dep. at 62:5-63:21 (A72). It 
is undisputed that the unit for which Ms. Jeudy was responsible was the unit that was not properly 
secured. See May 14, 2007 Burden Mem. (A5) (“Officer Juedy was the officer assigned to the 
unit.”). Accordingly, Officer Mendez is not a valid comparator for purposes of showing pretext.
13 Identifying a similarly situated comparator is an integral part of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination, which, as discussed above, Ms. Jeudy cannot do. Assuming, however, that 
Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case, the Court can also consider comparator evidence in its 
examination ofpretext. SeeRioux v. City o f Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1276-77; see also Ekokotu 
v. Fed. Express Corp., 408 F. App’x 331, 338 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, Ms. Jeudy attempts to 
establish a valid comparator by testifying that, during training, “everybody had their cell phones.” 
Jeudy Dep. at 48:18-19 (A69). It is important to note, however, that she does not identify any 
particular individual who had a cell phone at training— and, more specifically, one whose cell phone 
actually rang during training—but was not similarly reprimanded. Furthermore, she does not specify 
whether the employees who attended the training with their cell phones were outside of her protected 
class or whether any were in their probationary period. She merely contends that “everybody” at 
training had a cell phone. Id. Thus, Ms. Jeudy has not actually identified valid comparators.
15
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Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Ms. Jeudy does not contend that her unit was, 
in fact, fully and properly secured. Rather, she admits that one of the doors in her unit was not 
secured, but argues that, because this door was to a cell for inmates with disabilities and no one was 
in the cell at that time, it did not matter that she failed to properly secure it. See Jeudy Dep. at 
60:4-61:1 (A71-72) (“Q: There were no prisoners in that cell, so there was no real worry that it 
wasn’t closed? A: The inmates are held in a single cell, meaning, that room, it’s a single cell. There 
are no inmates in there. Mind you, I have to lock up at least 100 different cells, and I have ten 
minutes to do so. At the same time, I was throwing up and sick. So I closed the cells that the 
inmates were in. If a cell doesn’t have an inmate in it, why close it?”).
A plaintiff however, “is not allowed to recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory 
reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030; 
see also Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Federal courts do 
not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a 
reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the employee 
cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. 
A correctional officer’s failure to properly secure his or her unit in a federal detention center is 
certainly a reason that might motivate those in charge o f the facility to terminate or otherwise 
discipline the offending officer—irrespective of whether the cell left open actually houses inmates 
at that particular time. Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to each of Defendant’s proffered reasons for her termination, and summary judgment 
is therefore warranted.14
14 While not directly relevant to the analysis of Ms. Juedy’s race or sex discrimination claims 
discussed above, it is also notable that, throughout her deposition, Ms. Jeudy contends that she was 
actually terminated because she fell at work and because Defendant did not want to compensate her 
while she was out on leave. See Jeudy Dep. at 48:23-49:2 (A69-70) (“Q. Do you think you were 
fired for the simple mistake? A. I think I was fired because of the slip-and-fall injury, the fact that 
they had to pay me 75 percent of my pay while I’m on Workers’ Comp. That’s why I was 
terminated.”). If Ms. Jeudy truly believes that she was terminated because Defendant did not want 
to pay her while she was on leave, it casts additional doubt on the contention that Ms. Jeudy was in 
fact terminated for the discriminatory reasons alleged in this action.
16
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C. Retaliation
Finally, Ms. Jeudy contends that Defendant retaliated against her for complaining about 
sexual harassment by Lieutenant Burden. This claim differs from her claims of race and sex 
discrimination in that Ms. Jeudy does not allege that the denial of her requested accommodation and 
subsequent termination were in and of themselves discriminatory actions, but rather that such actions 
amounted to discrimination because they were taken in response to Ms. Jeudy’s decision to report 
sexual harassment. See Third Am. Compl. (D.E. #35) at 11. Ms. Jeudy’s retaliation claim, however, 
fails for the same reasons as the claims of race and sex discrimination claims discussed above.
The Court analyzes Ms. J eudy’s retaliation claim under the same burden-shifting framework 
applied to Title VII’s substantive provision. See Harrison v. In t’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 378 F. App’x 
950, 954 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that “Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims may be proven 
using circumstantial evidence and applying the burden shifting framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation v. Green”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Jeudy must 
show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (3) that there was some causal relationship between the two events. 
Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Holifield v. Reno, 
115 F.3d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing elements of a prima facie case of retaliation).
Ms. Jeudy’s contention that the denial of her requests for an accommodation amounts to an 
adverse action fares no better in the retaliation context. In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Supreme Court broadened the type of conduct considered 
actionable in Title VII retaliation claims. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“Under the holding in Burlington, the type of employer conduct considered actionable has 
been broadened from that which adversely affects the plaintiff’s conditions of employment or 
employment status to that which has a materially adverse effect on the plaintiff . . . .”).15 Now, to 
establish the adverse employment action element of a prima facie case o f retaliation, “a plaintiff must 
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which 
in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting 
a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 The standard announced in Burlington does not impact the adverse action standard 
applicable to claims of discrimination under Title VII’s substantive provision. See Crawford, 529 
F.3d at 974 n.14 (“It should be noted, however, that while the new standard enunciated in Burlington 
applies to Title VII retaliation claims, it has no application to substantive Title VII discrimination 
claims; the prior standard remains applicable to such claims.”).
17
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Even under this standard, however, the denial of Ms. Juedy’s requests does not constitute a 
materially adverse employment action. As noted above, it is simply not reasonable for an employee 
to find the denial of an accommodation materially adverse where he or she is not disabled or 
“regarded as” disabled, where the employee has not provided sufficient documentation of any 
disability to his or her employer, and where he or she is therefore not entitled to any accommodation 
by law. See Swain, 146 F.3d at 858; see also Seldon v. TotalSys. Servs. Inc., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 
1378-79 (holding, on a retaliation claim, that “under the particular circumstances presented by this 
case—where Plaintiff has not demonstrated her entitlement to an accommodation, has not 
communicated to her employer the specific facts regarding her specific need of an accommodation, 
and where no change in job duties or hours was made—no reasonable person could conclude that 
[the supervisor’s] failure to adjust Plaintiff’s schedule to accommodate her unspecified ‘health 
problems’ was materially adverse.”); Ragin v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05 Civ. 6496(PGG), 
2010 WL 1326779, at *20 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2010) (discussing Seldon and concluding, in the 
context of a retaliation claim, that “the alleged failure to quickly accommodate Plaintiff’s condition 
does not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII, because Plaintiff’s condition did 
not qualify her as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act”). Accordingly, Ms. Jeudy’s 
termination is the only employment action sufficient to establish the adverse action prong of her 
prima facie case.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Ms. Jeudy can meet the other two elements of her 
prima facie case,16 her retaliation claim must fail because she cannot establish a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the reasons provided for her termination are pretextual. As discussed 
above, even if  Ms. Jeudy can raise a question of fact regarding whether the introduction of her cell 
phone into the facility was a legitimate reason for her termination, she has failed to present any 
evidence that the Defendant’s second legitimate reason for her termination, her failure to properly 
secure her unit on May 14, 2007, is pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. As noted above, Ms. 
Jeudy admits that she did not fully secure her unit. See Jeudy Dep. at 60:4-61: 1 (A71-72). She 
simply contends that the way in which she violated protocol— failing to secure a door to a vacant 
cell— cannot create a basis for her termination. It is not enough, however, for Ms. Jeudy to simply
16 Defendant contends that Ms. Jeudy cannot establish a causal relationship between her 
verbal complaint of sexual harassment and her termination. See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for 
Summ. J. (D.E. #41-1) at 14-16. He does not contest that Ms. Jeudy engaged in a protected activity 
by reporting the alleged sexual harassment.
18
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disagree with the wisdom behind Defendant’s business decisions, and it is not appropriate for this 
Court to reexamine such decisions. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. 
Because Ms. Jeudy has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that both 
reasons provided by Defendant in support of Ms. Jeudy’s termination are pretextual, summary 
judgment is appropriate. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037; Combs, 106 F.3d at 1539-43.
III. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, Ms. Jeudy has failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether she suffered from a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. 
Similarly, even assuming that Ms. Jeudy can establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on 
race, sex, and retaliation under Title VII, she has failed to adduce enough evidence to create a factual 
question as to whether both of the stated reasons for her termination were pretextual. Accordingly, 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full. The Court will issue a separate 
order entering final judgment in favor of Defendant and closing this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida, November 7, 2011.
Paul C. Huck
United States District Judge
Copies furnished to: 
Counsel of record
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